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Abstract
The shaping of international order, and the place of concepts such as law and community
within that order, has emerged as one of the most pressing issues in contemporary legal and polit-
ical thought. This Essay examines three recent theses, each of which attempts to locate a public
philosophy appropriate to the emerging new world order. Part I of this Essay takes a look at these
theses: the orthodox Kantian theory of international relations, as recently articulated by Fernando
Teson in A Philosophy of International Law, the liberal communitarian theory, which has been
eloquently restated by Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Re-
form in Liberal Education, and the institutional rationalism of Jurgen Habermas, as described in
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.’ Part II
of this Essay suggests that the disparity between these alternative theses can be situated within the
post-Kantian attempt to determine the moral self within modern political communities. There are,
in effect, two Kants: one, which we can term the formalist, and which has enjoyed dominion in
Kantian theories of international law, and another, the communitarian, which has gained increas-
ing currency in radical liberal political theory. The final part of this Essay then takes these theses
and situates them within the specific context of the new European order.
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The shaping of international order, and the place of con-
cepts such as law and community within that order, has emerged
as one of the most pressing issues in contemporary legal and
political thought. This Essay examines three recent theses, each
of which attempts to locate a public philosophy appropriate to
the emerging new world order. Part I of this Essay takes a look
at these theses: the orthodox Kantian theory of international re-
lations, as recently articulated by Fernando Tes6n in A Philosophy
of International Law, the liberal communitarian theory, which has
been eloquently restated by Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Hu-
manity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, and the
institutional rationalism ofJfirgen Habermas, as described in Be-
tween Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy.' Part II of this Essay suggests that the disparity
between these alternative theses can be situated within the post-
Kantian attempt to determine the moral self within modern
political communities. There are, in effect, two Kants: one,
which we can term the formalist, and which has enjoyed domin-
ion in Kantian theories of international law, and another, the
communitarian, which has gained increasing currency in radical
liberal political theory. The final part of this Essay then takes
these theses and situates them within the specific context of the
new European order.
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1. FERNANDO R. TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY:. A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM IN LIBERAL EDUCA-
TION (1997); JORGEN HAPERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A Dis-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., Mass. Inst. Tech. Press,
1996) (1992).
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I. THREE THESES
A. The Foundations of International Order
Fernando Tes6n sets out from the basic recommendation
that Kant was the first modern philosopher to recognize that
questions of domestic and international justice were "fundamen-
tally connected." It is not, of course, an entirely original sugges-
tion, having been recently articulated by the likes of Janna
Thompson, and previously by a number of early twentieth-cen-
tury Kantians, such as Ernst Cassirer and Gustav Radbruch. It is,
however, valid.' The reason for the connection lies in the funda-
mental liberal acceptance of the "normative status of the individ-
ual." The idea of right is vested within the moral self, and not in
the gift of the state, and so applies across the jurisprudential
spectrum to both domestic and international law. In turn, the
moral legitimacy of a political community, and any order be-
tween these communities, is founded upon a proper acknowl-
edgement of the source of rights within the moral self.3
Kant's primary essay on international law, Perpetual Peace,4
was, Tes6n suggests, founded upon this basic premise. This
premise, in terms of political philosophy, translated into the
need for all modern states to enjoy the qualities of liberal de-
mocracy. These qualities are a respect for individual autonomy,
the basic Kantian idea of the categorical imperative, legislative
independence and commonalty, all legal acts derived from a sin-
gle sovereign legislator, and a principle of equality or rule of law.
A state that inheres these qualities enjoys, according to Tes6n,
"moral standing." At the same time, because of the inculcating
of proper Kantian principles of respect for the autonomy of
2. See JANNA THOMPSON, JUSTICE AND WORLD ORDER: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
(1992). Though writing half a century ago, Gustav Radbruch's treatment of interna-
tional order remains instructive, not least because he recognized the classic liberal diffi-
culty of expressing tolerance of others' political philosophy, while wishing to condemn
the emerging totalitarianism of Hitler and Mussolini. Thus, in terms of international
law and order, he is keen to condemn Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, and yet does so
from the perspective of positive international law, rather than fundamental individual
rights. See Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RAD-
BRUCH AND DRABIN 49 (Edwin W. Patterson ed. & Kurt Wilk trans., Harvard Univ. Press,
1950) (3d ed. 1932). For Cassirer's provocative critique of the myth of the nation-state,
and his perhaps prophetic suggestion that its end was in sight, see ERNST CASSIRER, THE
MYTH OF THE STATE (1946).
3. TES6N, supra note 1, at 1-3.
4. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1957).
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others, such states will necessarily recognize that such a public
philosophy defines a state of ',perpetual peace," which is, after
all, the purpose of international law and order. Respect for lib-
erty, sovereignty, and equality is the only means by which mod-
ern states can remain both legitimate and settled.5
Relatedly, there are two arguments in support of the Kant-
ian theory of international order: the empirical and the princi-
pled. Thus, while history evidences the. relative peace and pros-
perity enjoyed by alliances of liberal communities, adherence to
principles of immanent rationality preserves the integrity of any
legal order. Significantly, Tes6n suggests that the "success of the
European Union" is perhaps the most striking example of the
acuity of Kant's thesis. There has to be a deeper reason why lib-
eral democracies tend towards peaceful relations, however, and
that is, once again, a respect for the "pure concept of right" as
defined by, and definitive of, the moral self.6
Having established his commitment to a classical Kantian
thesis that is based on Kant's idea of the moral self, rather than
his later adherence to the political community, Tes6n proceeds
to a series of critiques of alternative theories of international law.
The first is the positivist conception that international law is de-
fined in the relatively simple terms of dealings between states
that enjoy sovereign authority. Such a thesis, as originally ex-
pounded by the likes of Grotius, defines the kind of orthodox
international law that is described in terms of treaty commit-
ments. Although Kant did presume to work in terms of nation-
states, Tes6n rightly notes that there is no such thing as discrete
nation-state sovereignty in the post-modern world.7 This ab-
sence is only of concern to confirmed positivists who need to be
able to isolate sovereign authority within particular political insti-
tutions. If sovereignty vests in individuals, however, as it does in
the Kantian idea of the moral self, then such jurisdictional argu-
ments are redundant.8 This argument is of interest to European
lawyers, not least because the Union and Community tend to
identify their constitutional legitimacy in terms of treaties be-
5. TES6N, supra note 1, at 3-11.
6. Id. at 11-16.
7. This insight, as we shall see in the final part of this Essay, has gained currency in
the particular area of European legal studies. See, most obviously perhaps, N. Mac-
Cormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REv. 1-19 (1993).
8. TES6N, supra note 1, at 16-19, 3944.
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tween supposedly sovereign nation-states. A genuine commu-
nity, founded on an idea of Kantian right, must treat such legal-
ism as conceptually irrelevant.
A second thesis, the realist, is closely related to the positivist.
A realist thesis suggests that international behavior can only be
understood in terms of the aggressive self-interest of various
communities, most commonly nation-states. Entirely descriptive
rather than normative, such a thesis is, once again, dismissive of
ideas of fundamental individual rights grounded in the moral
self. The affinity between realism and utilitarianism is immedi-
ate-the legitimacy of political acts is founded upon their value
to the political community or even to individual citizens.9
The dismissal of realist theories of international behavior
carries an implicit critique of communitarian theses, which
Tes6n argues at some length in an ensuing discussion of John
Rawls' recent writings on political liberalism and international
order.10 In an essay entitled The Law of Peoples, Rawls has taken
his non-foundationalism political liberalism and applied it to the
question of the moral status of non-liberal states.11 The nature
of Rawls' political liberalism remains a matter of considerable
controversy. In his seminal work, A Theory ofJustice, Rawls main-
tained the veracity of a comprehensive moral theory, founded
securely on the twin Kantian principles of freedom and equal-
ity.12 During the previous two decades, culminating in the publi-
cation of Political Liberalism, however, Rawls increasingly shied
away from such a deep metaphysics, preferring to concentrate
instead upon the possibility of a constructive rationality
grounded only upon intensely contingent political "facts."1
• In The Law of Peoples, Rawls does indeed abandon the auto-
matic priority of classical liberalism. Presuming that interna-
tional politics is founded in the relation between states, he sug-
gests that there are three kinds of state: liberal, hierarchical,
9. Id. at 47-53.
10. Id. at 105-26.
11. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36-68 (1993).
12. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
13. SeeJOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). For one of the most compelling
discussions of the "new" Rawls, suggesting that the presentation of the non-founda-
tional thesis represents a turn toward a "post-modern bourgeois liberalism," see RICH-
ARD RORTY, OBJEcrIvrrv, RELATVSM, AND TRUTH 175-202 (1991). For an overview of the
Rawls-Rorty exchange, see Ian Ward, Another Look at the New Rawls, 24 ANGLO-AM. L.
REv. 104-22 (1995).
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and tyrannical. Although the latter can be treated as outside the
generally-respected norms of international law, the hierarchical,
while not necessarily respecting either fundamental freedom or
equality, can be "decent." The aspiration of such communities is
defined simply in terms of communal, rather than individual,
goods. 14
Tes6n is fiercely critical of this concession, accusing Rawls
of abandoning the core concept of "liberal individualism,"
namely fundamental "humanity." He is particularly critical of
Rawls' proposal of "enabling" rights-rights granted to citizens
in order to enable their participation in the political process but
which require a reciprocal obligation. a5 A political philosophy,
according to Tes6n, cannot be founded on a "group," but only
upon the individual. Groups are fluid entities, generally depen-
dent upon perpetuating myths of some sort of common identity,
whether historical, racial, ethnic, or nationalist. Aside from be-
ing essentially imaginary, such group identities are necessarily
exclusionary. Rather than promoting international peace, such
a politics depends upon creating conditions of contestation be-
tween groups.16 Once again, as we shall see, such a thesis reso-
nates strongly in the particular context of a Europe desperately
striving to curtail state nationalism while at the same time pro-
moting a sense of European affinity.
B. Humanity and the Narrative Community
It is precisely the idea of group identity and the sense of
reciprocal obligations between community and citizen that at-
tracts Martha Nussbaum. The founding ambition of Cultivating
Humanity is to rethink the process of educating "world citizens."
The aspiration of a liberal community should be one that seeks
to liberate the "mind from the bondage of habit and custom,"
fashioning people "who can function with sensitivity and alert-
14. Rawls, supra note 11, at 37, 59, 66-67.
15. Rawls describes these kinds of rights as requiring that persons be "responsible
and cooperating members of society who can recognize and act in accordance with
their moral duties and obligations." Id. at 57. An interesting comparison can be made
with Roberto Unger's critique of liberal rights. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). Unger, too, sought to define a more posi-
tive conception of rights of access to political institutions, all of which were founded
ultimately upon "solidarity" rights that provided legal authority for access rights within
the community.
16. TESON, supra note 1, at 133-37.
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ness as citizens of the whole world."17 It is not expressly a study
of international order, but the existence of a new world order is
the essential dynamic of Nussbaum's book. Following the classi-
cal communitarian thesis, which can be traced right back to Aris-
totle's Politics, the idea of liberal community and the education
of its members is founded upon a "particular norm of citizen-
ship." In other words, the sense of affinity that every community
needs is established by the inculcation of certain citizenship
responsiblities. A sense of belonging comes from a nurtured
sense of participation.
There is much in Nussbaum's thesis that can be situated
within orthodox communitarianism. In his Democracy's Discon-
tent, while addressing himself more immediately to the "search"
for an American "public philosophy," Michael Sandel sought to
reestablish an idea of participatory citizenship. Interestingly, in
citing various polities around the world that showed signs of
lacking a sense of affinity, Sandel alighted on the new Europe.
What Sandel did not do, of course, was try to locate a sense of
community that was common throughout the world, and that
could then cut across positive state jurisdictions. The idea that
"humanity" itself could serve to secure a modern public philoso-
phy is, he suggests, "difficult to imagine." In reality, people live
their "lives by smaller solidarities. '
The idea that individuals live in smaller communities, and
share affinities with those communities, however, does not nec-
essarily preclude a complementary sense of humanity.19 It is the
attempt to do precisely this, to reinvest a sense of humanity and
world citizenship, that distinguishes Nussbaum's thesis. Nuss-
baum seeks to affirm that all political communities share certain
constitutive aspects. Most importantly, all political communities
seek to describe a mythical affinity based on commonly per-
ceived cultural traditions-historical, literary, and aesthetic. She
terms this perception the "narrative imagination." 20
17. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at ix, 8.
18. MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 339-44 (1996).
19. Indeed, Sandel recognizes that, in a world where nation-states can no longer
claim dominion over the affinities of their citizens, it is now necessary to talk in terms of
cosmopolitan citizenship. He uses this recognition, however, to justify reconcentrating
political power in small communities, rather than reinvesting a sense of universal hu-
manity. Id. at 343-44.
20. The idea that communities are created, and maintained, by means of a polit-
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The mechanics of Nussbaum's thesis lie most immediately
in communication and its media. As she suggested in her earlier
Love's Knowledge, it is literature that most effectively "speaks
about us, about our lives and choices and emotions, about our
social existence and the totality of our connections." We live our
lives, and most importantly learn to live our lives, aesthetically,
through conversation with both texts and fellow citizens, and any
political community is "formed by" the relation between its "au-
thor and readers."2' This manner of living is not something par-
ticular to any one community. Rather, it is the common experi-
ence of humanity. Because, all localized political communities
from parishes to nation-states are founded on this idea of a polit-
ical and narrative imagination, then so might be a revitalized
sense of world community. 22
Accordingly, for Nussbaum, the new "world citizen" will be
defined by an ability to relate to "stories of people's real diversity
and complexity," to "think what it might be like to be in the
shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent
reader of that person's story, and to understand the emotions
and wishes and desires that someone so placed might-have."
Moreover, it is only through the nurtured ability to "identify"
with others that individuals can exercise an informed moral
judgment. It is in this way that humanity is "cultivated" so that it
can participate in the political community while recognizing the
intrinsic and fundamental value of others as fellow moral selves.
In such a way, a liberal education, respecting the Socratic ideal
of critical moral inquiry, can reveal a "life that is open to the
ical and narrative imagination has become increasingly popular among a number of
communitarians. For an original statement, see CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:
THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989). For a discussion of the idea of narrative
communitarianism and its potential value in legal studies, see Ian Ward, Literature and
the Legal Imagination, N. IR. LEGAL Q. (forthcoming 1999).
21. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERA-
TURE 3-7, 142-76 (1990).
22. There is much here that chimes with the conversationalism of such as Richard
Rorty, for whom "[t]he world does not speak. Only we do." According to Rorty, to "see
one's language, one's conscience, one's morality, and one's hopes as contingent prod-
ucts, as literalizations of what once were accidently produced metaphors, is to adopt a
self-identity which suits one for citizenship in an ideally liberal state." See RICHARD
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY- 5-6, 50-54, 60-61 (1989). There is also a
certain concordance with Drucilla Cornell's attempt to define the "philosophy of the
limit" in terms of dialogic enactment of "ethical relations," something that she readily
cites as form of "Kantian constructivism." See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY Do-
MAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3-18 (1995).
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whole world." This critical ability will show ultimately that there
is "more joy in the kind of citizenship that questions than in the
kind that simply applauds, more fascination in the study of
human beings in all their real variety and complexity than in the
zealous pursuit of superficial stereotypes, more genuine love and
friendship in the life of questioning and self-government than in
submission to authority." Ultimately, the "future of democracy"
across the world depends upon cultivating both a sense of hu-
manity and its defining characteristic: the ability to exercise in-
formed moral judgment.23
Nussbaum's most immediate intellectual authority is Aris-
totle, whose political and ethical philosophy has consistently in-
formed her writings. Yet, this influence does not preclude a
Kantian affinity. As Hannah Arendt, one of Kant's most persua-
sive twentieth-century commentators, and one of Nussbaum's
most obvious intellectual progenitors, argued, the Kantian moral
self and the virtuous Aristotelian citizen can be, and in concep-
tual terms are, the same.24 The moral self is the idea that founds
any "metaphysics of morals"; the virtuous citizen is the political
concept fashioned by their synthetic relation. The affirmation
that the mature "world citizen" is one who is properly equipped
with the ability to exercise moral judgment in terms of a respect
for the fundamental humanity of both self and others is entirely
Kantian in conception. We will return to this thesis shortly.
C. Law, Democracy, and Discourse Theory
For a number of decades, Juergen Habermas has attempted
to describe a radical theory of participatory democracy-a pro-
ject largely driven by a perceived crisis of legitimacy in modern
liberal states, including, more recently the European "state." At
the root of this crisis, he suggests, is modernity's obsession with
identity-the subjectivity of the self as co-determinative with the
"other." The fragmentation of late twentieth-century societies
militates against unitary identities and concomitant ideas of "sol-
23. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 84-86, 94-97.
24. For Arendt's original statement of their affinity, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958). Arendt returned to the theme toward the end of her career
when thinking about the idea of moral judgment, and again sought to present a Kanti-
anism that could complement the basic idea of political community of virtuous citizens.
See HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ronald Beiner ed.,
1982), for a collection of these thoughts.
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idarity." 5 But whereas Tes6n and Nussbaum, in their own dif-
ferent ways, attempt to reground the relation between self and
community in some form of political morality, for Habermas the
nature of a "post-metaphysical" world renders such solutions ar-
cane. Instead, in Between Facts and Norms, he seeks to flesh out
the implications of his theory of "communicative action" as a
constituent of a community consciousness. Following Hegel and
Arendt, he suggests that such a consciousness is created rather
than discovered. There is a certain resemblance here with Nuss-
baum's communitarianism, but Habermas explicitly denies the
universalist implications. Post-metaphysical political thought is
precisely located between "facticity" and "normativity," between
arrant contingency and totalizing foundationalism. 26
Devoid of such foundationalism, the legitimacy of (post)
modern states is entirely dependent upon the veracity of their
democratic institutions. Whereas liberal legalism has deliber-
ately restricted the capacity of individuals to participate actively
in the "discourses" of government, Habermas's thesis is dedi-
cated to reinvesting the "common practice of associated citi-
zens."27 The legitimacy of modern political communities is thus
entirely consonant with the legitimacy of modern law, and the
processes of its construction. Law "can be preserved as legiti-
mate only if enfranchized citizens switch from the role of private
legal subjects and take the perspective of participants who are
engaged in the process of reaching understanding about the
rules for their life in common. ' 2 It is for this reason that,
whereas Tes6n concentrates on ethical principle and Nussbaum
on the narrative processes of community formation, Habermas
turns most immediately to constitutional jurisprudence.
Legitimacy is the key concept in the crisis of modernity, and
political legitimacy is wholly dependant upon the "interpenetra-
tion of the discourse principle and the legal form." A constitu-
tion must legitimate those rules and laws that "refer reflexively to
the function of social integration." The rules of political and
social behavior are only legitimate if they are constructed as a
25. This is a thesis that has found support among a number of contemporary social
and political theorists. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF
AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE 2-9, 37-65, 109-11 (1991).
26. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 141.
27. Id. at 321.
28. Id. at 461.
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result of a broad "background consensus" fashioned by the dis-
cussion of all participant citizens. This construction is the prin-
ciple of "democratic reciprocity," and all legitimate political in-
stitutions must be dedicated to its facility. 29 The practice of com-
municative action is engaged in the "spontaneous sources of
autonomous public spheres"-the various "lifeworlds," from
family to workplace to civic and national authorities, which ulti-
mately constitute the political community. Conceived in this
way, democratic politics is all-encompassing, for in "the vertigo
of this freedom, there is no longer any fixed point outside that
of democratic procedure itself." Accordingly, each of these
"lifeworlds" must be democratized. The "success of a delibera-
tive politics" depends upon "the institutionalization of the corre-
sponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well
as the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with
informally developed public opinions.""
Only if laws are fashioned in such a way, through the media
of properly open and democratic institutions, will they be legiti-
mate because only in such a way will they be rational. Here,
Habermas' idea of practical reason is strikingly reminiscent of
Rawls's constructive rationality and explicitly Kantian in origin."1
In terms of public political philosophy, this idea of reason neces-
sitates a "dynamic understanding" of law and politics as forever
incomplete and incompletable-a contingency defined by, and
thus founded in, the very idea of a constructive rationality. The
modern individual, Habermas concludes, identifies not with a
comprehensive moral theory, either Kantian or communitarian,
but with democratic procedures. It is only by addressing the
politics of affinity in this way that the flagging sense of social
"solidarity" in modern politics can be revived.
It is, ultimately, a matter of reinvesting a sense of participa-
tion in, legitimacy of, and thus affinity with, modern "administra-
tive" states. In modern states, Habermas readily admits, govern-
ment is both necessary and complex. At the same time, however,
despite this complexity, there can be no justification either for a
lack of transparency or for the minimalization of individual
29. Id. at 14-16, 80-81, 91, 121, 287-88.
30. Id. at 186, 298-99, 360-91.
31. For Rawls's theory of Kantian constructivism, see RAwLS, supra note 13, at 164-
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rights-both negative rights of private space and positive rights
of political participation. Once again, therefore, it is a funda-
mentally jurisprudential issue, for the proper institution of law
and right becomes the "medium through which the structures of
mutual recognition already familiar from simple interactions
and quasi-natural solidarities can be transmitted, in an abstract
but binding form, to the complex and increasingly anonymous
spheres of a functionality differentiated society." In a "complex"
and "differentiated" society, the laws described through legiti-
mate democratic institutions are the guarantors of both individ-
ual liberty and social solidarity. 2
II. THE TWO KANTS
In one sense, then, Tes6n, Nussbaum, and Habermas all
seem to have a common aspiration: rethinking public philoso-
phy in a changing world order. But their solutions, at least at
first glance, appear to be rather different. Using the formalist
idea of Kantian right, Tes6n adheres to the idea of fundamental
humanity and the vesting of rights in moral selves. Nussbaum,
while supporting the idea of fundamental humanity, sees it as
something that shapes and is shaped by political communities,
which are themselves narrative constructions, expressions of
both individuality and commonality. For Habermas, however,
the time for universal or comprehensive theories is past. The
only concept that can found a political community is law. By
that he means law that is the product of the constructive dialogic
rationality of all its citizens. Whereas for Tes6n and Nussbaum
law is legitimated by its acknowledgement of fundamental hu-
manity, for Habermas it is legitimated by the transparency and
democratic facility of its political institutions.
Yet, these divergent views are in fact closely aligned, for they
are all situated within, and represent, various derivatives of a
Kantian public philosophy. In very basic terms, where Tes6n
and to a certain extent Nussbaum maintain a closer adherence
to the idea of right,'Habermas concentrates on describing the
concept of law. The core principle of a Kantian political philoso-
phy, as opposed to merely its legal theory, is the idea that there is
a synthetic relation between the idea of right, derived from a
priori principles and the concept of law, the evolving and relative
32. HABERmAs, supra note 1, at .318, 373.
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product of a posteriori political experience. In this sense, then,
there are two Kants: the ideal and the conceptual. But the two
are part of a whole, and, as was most immediately emphasized in
Kant's final unifying work, The Metaphysics of Morals,33 are dedi-
cated to the pressing issue of describing a public philosophy for
an emerging modern world.34
The idea of the moral self, upon which advocates of a Kant-
ian human rights, like Tes6n, concentrate their attention, was
present from the first of Kant's three Critiques. The central the-
sis of the Critique of Pure Reason was the idea that metaphysics is
reconstituted through individual reason. 5 The moral self is de-
scribed by this rational capacity, an idea of reason, and then it
self-governs, self-determines, and self-creates by applying this
reason in the a posteriori conditions of real political experience.
The duality of reason and experience describes Kant's basic syn-
thetic model: everything has an idea-a product of pure reason,
and a concept-an experiential approximation of it. It was, of
course, a model explicitly derived from the Aristotelian distinc-
tion between form and substance. 36
Kant then developed this idea of the moral self further in
the Groundwork to a Metaphysics of Morals, by prescribing a series
of duties, themselves products of reason and experience. The
duality was critical because it meant that morality and political
behavior could not be distinguished from the basic synthetic
model. Politics cannot be reduced to experience alone, but
must be grounded within the rational dictates of the moral self.
The categorical imperative was the singular recognition of this
critical appreciation-a completely political idea derived from
the autonomy of all rational selves interacting within a political
community. At its simplest level, the imperative is a "universal"
33. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63 (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1991) (1797).
34. Tes6n suggestively acknowledges that there are two "Rawlses." TESON, supra
note 1, at 121. He describes the two as the principled and the relativist. Indeed, the
progression in Rawls' thought, from a theory of justice to a political liberalism, is strik-
ingly reminiscent of Kant's switch from the metaphysics of pure reason to the metaphys-
ics of right. The demarcation can be taken too far, however. It is primarily a distinction
of utilitarian value, in that it provides a useful tool for analyzing the development of
Kant's own thought. Id.
35. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith trans., St.
Martin's Press, 1929) (1787).
36. See IAN WARD, KANTiANISM, POSTMODERNISM AND CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 6-9
(1997) (discussing this modelling).
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rule for the mutual respect of all citizens within that commu-
nity. 37
The recognition that the synthetic quality of the imperative
demanded a recognition of the conceptual reality of political
communities is essential to a proper understanding of Kant's
political philosophy-an understanding often underestimated
by those who seek to locate a Kantian jurisprudence within the
exposition of rights alone. 38 As Kant then went on to acknowl-
edge, in the closing passages of the second Critique of Practical
Reason, the final "end" of the moral self lies in rational participa-
tion within a political "community. '3 9 It is at this point that Kan-
tians of a more formalist bent, such as Tes6n, detach themselves,
while narrative communitarians such as Nussbaum take the cri-
tique on to the conclusion admitted in Kant's later political writ-
ings.
The political implications of Kant's critique of reason were
vividly drawn in the final of the Critiques, published in 1790, the
Critique ofJudgement. The pivotal idea behind the third Critique is
contingency and how to account for it. Rather than concentrat-
ing on pure practical reason, Kant turned to an alternative
"faculty" of judgment-an aesthetic faculty, and one that appre-
ciates that, in matters of subjectivity, everything is judged on its
particular merits. Politics, Kant emphasized, is constituted as an
aesthetic as well as a moral idea.4" Kant readily acknowledges
that political communities are the products of aesthetic and his-
torical developments. In other words, they are products of a nar-
rative political imagination. But, again, as Nussbaum has more
recently reaffirmed, this view does not necessitate the abandon-
ment of universal principles of humanity. As Kant emphasizes,
politics is about "thinking the particular," within political com-
munities, while acknowledging that the universality of the ra-
tional moral self retains the critical capacity to ground applied
37. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK TO A METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 70, 74-80 (1964).
In GROUNDWORK, the imperative was formulated as "I ought never to act except in such
a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." Id.
38. For a judicious discussion of the proper relation of idea and concept in Kant-
ian legal thought, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949-1016 (1988).
39. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON.
40. This particular idea has recently been subjected to a rigorous, and supportive,
critique by Paul Crowther. See PAUL CROWTHER, THE KANTIAN SUBLIME: FROM MORALITY
TO ART (1989); PAUL CROWTHER, CRITICAL AESTHETICS AND POSTMODERNISM (1993).
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ideas of reason.41 Humanity is contingently situated, and by ex-
ercising rational judgment, acknowledges this. In other words,
all moral questions are applied moral questions.42
For the purposes of reconciling the classical and the com-
munitarian Kants, the pivotal sections of the third Critique are
numbers twenty-one and forty, in which he addresses the idea of
communicative rationality, or, as he terms it, the "sensus com-
munis." This rationale is the reason constructed by the interac-
tion of moral selves that make up a community-the "critical
faculty which in its reflective act takes account of the mode of
reflection of every one else. 43 In this way, though the human
capacity of each moral self is defined by an immanent rational-
ity, the political rationality will be fashioned within the particular
circumstances of deliberation. This fundamental relation pro-
vided the metaphysical frame for the various political writings
that occupied Kant during the final decade of his life. In an
essay entitled What is Orientation in Thinking?, making specific
recourse to Aristotle, Kant affirmed that the "highest good can-
not be achieved merely by the exertions of the single individual
toward his own moral perfection, but instead requires a union of
such individuals into a whole working towards the same end."
Indeed, the idea of "enlightenment," according to Kant, was de-
fined by the aspiration of individuals to rationalize the common
good within particular political communities. The entire critical
project was, in this way, dedicated to the need to present a credi-
ble public philosophy.44
In the light of Kant's sensus communis, a proper treatment of
Kantian jurisprudence articulated in the Metaphysics of Morals be-
comes rather more than a simple exposition on right. Published
in 1797, the Metaphysics was Kant's final work and represented
the culmination of an original ambition to present a compre-
hensive public philosophy founded on the principles of pure
practical reason. The first part of the Metaphysics is, indeed,
dedicated to an exposition on the "doctrine of right." As op-
posed to natural law theories of right, for Kant, of course, rights
41. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OFJUDGEMENT 407 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991)
(1790).
42. Id. at 111.
43. Id. at 151.
44. KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, 237, 249 (Hans Reiss ed. & H. B. Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991).
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were founded in the moral self. As an idea, right was founded
on "innate" principles of freedom and equality, while the con-
ceptual complements, or approximations, defined by the syn-
thetic model, were all derived from the same two principles.
Thus, for example, legal concepts have to be founded on free-
dom and equality: the applied political expression of the cate-
gorical imperative.45 The idea of right is then conceptualized in
terms of duties immanent to the moral self, meaning that it is
rational and in the political situation will be an expression of
practical reason. In this way, Kant can admit the practical reality
of civil rights, while ensuring that such rights are legitimate only
insofar as they are derived from the a priori principle of rights as
an expression of fundamental humanity.4 6
The idea of right, both as founding principle and as a prac-
tical political concept, is thus central to a Kantian public philoso-
phy. But it does not- itself define the whole of that philosophy,
for equally critical is the second part of the Metaphysics, the part
too often ignored by Kantian formalists like Tes6n. This part is
the second "doctrine": "virtue."47 Whereas the first doctrine
seeks to extrapolate the founding rights that attach to moral
selves, the second doctrine is premised upon the political reality
of selves situated within political communities. The fact that
moral selves conceptualize within political communities necessi-
tates the admission of certain rules of positive morality and duty,
aside from the merely negative duties defined by the basic cate-
gorical imperative.
In a number of contemporaneous essays, including Wat is
Orientation in Thinking?, Kant makes explicit reference to Aris-
totle, for whom, of course, virtue defined the philosophy of
law.4" For Kant, however, virtue fulfils a more restricted func-
tion-devoted to the refinement of ethical matters, but concep-
tually distinct from matters of legal right. The maxims of virtue
present guides to ethical behavior, necessary complements to
right, which require positive application- in order to secure the
pursuit of the common good. In its simplest sense, being nice to
one another is a virtue, a moral duty, necessary for this pursuit,
45. KANT, supra note 33.
46. Id. at 51, 189, 195-96.
47. For a more thorough exposition of the situation of the second doctrine within
the METAPHYSICS, supra note 33, as a whole, see WARD, supra note 36, at 32-35.
48. See ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS (Penguin Books, 1976).
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but not demanded by law or right. Even though such civility is
not demanded by law, however, rights seek to complement and
to approximate civil virtues and should thereby look to "perfect"
both one's own "happiness" and that of "others." Law can, and
should, encourage communal virtues, even if it is primarily dedi-
cated to protecting individual rights.49
Although, as we noted, communitarians like Nussbaum tend
to concentrate upon the original statement of these duties, in
the classical tradition of Aristotle, their re-articulation in Kant's
political writings is pivotal to their reception in modern liberal
political thought. The potential implications for a Kantian polit-
ical theory that addresses more than formal right have been
noted by a number of twentieth-century commentators. The ex-
tent to which a mature theory of individual freedom must appre-
ciate the inherent capacity of these positive duties within a dis-
crete political philosophy was fully appreciated by Isaiah Berlin.
The "ends of men," as Berlin emphasises, "are many," and a
proper understanding of "liberty" must recognize that individu-
als are endowed, as an expression of their humanity, with the
capacity and the right to determine their own political ends
within their community. The "positive" conception of liberty is
evidenced by the capacity to participate in the political processes
of this determination. 50
Aside from Berlin, the acknowledgement that duties are a
necessary constitutent of an integral theory of right was the cen-
tral thesis in Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philoso-
phy-a series dedicated to attempting to reconcile the two Kants,
of moral reason and moral judgment-within the entire and dis-
crete Kantian "architectonic." The overriding purpose of Ar-
endt's Lectures is to read the Metaphysics in the context of the
faculty of judgment as described in the third Critique: the ac-
commodation of universal ideas of humanity with the relative
politics constituted by individual communities. In rhetoric that
strikingly anticipated that of Habermas, Arendt suggested that
Kant recognized that modernity was defined by political differ-
ence, and that such difference was the central gear of "enlight-
49. KANT, supra note 33, at 190-97. For an intriguing and suggestive discussion of
Aristotelian virtue, and particularly the function of friendship within modern political
thought, see JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP (1996).
50. See I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191-242
(1997).
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enment" and progress. A Kantian public philosophy, accord-
ingly, is about the ability to accommodate alternative political
meanings and values, rather than imposing certain foundational
truths. Moraljudgment, while grounded by the idea of morality,
becomes an immediate and political expression of communal
values. It is in the light of this interpretation of Kant that Arendt
can then place the second doctrine, of virtue, within an Aristote-
lian "politics of friendship." The sensus communis, as an articula-
tion of moral judgment within the particular political situation,
describes the essential "sociability" of humanity.5 1
A third example of invoking Kant in order to reinvest a poli-
tics of community with a founding principle of humanity is pro-
vided byjean-Francois Lyotard. According to Lyotard, post-mod-
ernism describes an attempt to refound a Kantian public philos-
ophy without the modern "metanarratives" of substantive moral
principle. The Differend was dedicated to extracting the two
Kants, the political and philosophical, and then unifying them
again in Kant's appreciation of the narrative nature of political
morality-an understanding that bears immediate comparison
with Nussbaum's attempt to universalize the politics of commu-
nity. The idea of difference, so central to post-modern jurispru-
dence, revisits the Kantian appreciation that the idea of justice
enjoys a plurality of legal concepts-a difference that is itself de-
fined by the idea of the individual as an end in itself. Seizing
upon the idea of a sensus communis, Lyotard suggests that justice
is defined, not in the classical liberal sense of negative rights, but
in the positive sense of facilitating political participation-the
"calling forth" of the "community of addressors and address-
ees.' 52 In his final political writings, again shadowing Kant's own
intellectual development, Lyotard suggested that a post-modern,
or "post-humanist,"" politics must be "participatory," built upon
51. ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 24, at 52-58,
61-64, 72-77; see Ronald Beiner, Interpretive Essay, in ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLIT-
ICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 89, 119-24 (discussing Arendt's use of Kant); Patrick Riley,
Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth and Politics, in ESSAYS ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(Howard Lloyd Williams ed., 1992) (emphasizing, in particular, the extent to which
their shared use of Kant describes obvious intellectual affinity between Arendt and
Habermas).
52. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND 118-23, 130-41, 155-58, 169 (1988); see
GEOFFREY BENNINGTON, LYoTARD: WRITING THE EVENT 34-35, 114 (1988) (discussing Ly-
otard's underlying Kantian aspirations).
53. SeeJEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, POLITICAL WRITINGS 108-11 (1993); BILL READINGS,
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the "openness" of language. Starting from Nussbaum's central
premise, that individual moral judgment is defined by the narra-
tive community within which the moral self exercises that judg-
ment, Lyotard progresses to prescribe the same political facility
demanded by Habermas. For Lyotard, indeed, it serves to rede-
fine what is meant by justice.
III. EUROPE AND THE SEARCH FOR A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
The search for a European public philosophy has taken on
a particular urgency among contemporary scholars. It is com-
mon to talk of a pervasive "crisis in governance" in Europe.54 It
is, however, more than simply a question of governance. A pub-
lic philosophy suggests something more: the detection and pro-
motion of a political or constitutional morality. Ultimately, it
suggests the need for a common good, one that, in the Platonic
tradition, describes a congruence between self and community.
Such an approach has attracted some critical attention. Along
these lines, for example, Joseph Weiler has argued that the crisis
of government betokens a deeper crisis of legitimacy, and more-
over, that the issue is a constitutional and jurisprudential one.
Although reluctant to adopt a communitarian analysis of the Eu-
ropean "crisis of legitimacy," by concentrating on a need to re-
think the consonance between constitutions and the political
communities that they seek to describe, Weiler necessarily ori-
ents his theses towards the more particular kind of narrative hu-
manism articulated by those such as Nussbaum. His resultant
argument, that the issue of legitimacy can only be resolved in
terms of democratic reform that can secure a "structured model
of critical citizenship," effectively translates Nussbaum's analysis
into Habermas' solution. Moreover, his recent suggestion that
INTRODUCING LYOTARD: ART AND POLITICS 137-39 (1991) (discussing Lyotard's later
political writings and their derivation in Kant).
54. See Juliet Lodge, Towards a Political Union?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 383-85 (Juliet Lodge ed., 1993); Griinne de Burca, The Quest
for Legitimacy in the European Union, 59 MOD. L. REv. 349, 374-76 (1996) (providing more
recent analysis of crisis, characterizing it as primarily one of government and institu-
tionalism); see also D. CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1997) (offering more general discussion of the
subject).
55. SeeJ.H.H. Weiler, European Neo-constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order, in CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN AND THE-
ORETICAL PERSPECTWES 105-21 (R. Bellamy & D. Castiglione eds., 1996).
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Europe recognizes certain "transnational affinities to shared val-
ues" that are themselves the product of "reflective, deliberative
rational choice" further serves to confirm the congruence be-
tween his thesis and that described within the Kantian tradi-
tion."
At the same time, while the present crises of legitimacy and
identity that afflict Europe are in some ways particular, the prod-
uct of a modern history that is peculiarly described in terms of
nation-statism, they are also part of a wider crisis in international
order.5 7 As Francis Fukuyama has suggested, it is a pervasive cri-
sis bred of competing dynamics of fragmentation and integra-
tion-a world defined by forces that demand competition but
seek to rediscover a sense of "trust."58 The three theses intro-
duced in the first part of this Essay all subscribe to this more
general global analysis. Yet, while Tes6n and Nussbaum restrict
themselves to certain allusive comments on particular geo-polit-
ical examples of this crisis, including Europe, Habermas has
made a more concentrated study of the putative European or-
der.5" It is a study that, for obvious reasons, warrants our partic-
ular attention.
Habermas sees the "melancholic mood" that presently af-
flicts Europe as being reflective of a global lack of confidence.6"
In an increasingly competitive, fragmenting, and anxious world,
Europe is merely the most competitive, fragmentary, and anx-
ious of all. On one level, the most immediate need is to resist
the challenge of unrestrained capital. Articulating a thesis not
56. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 97-131 (1997); Europe: The Case Against the Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. LJ. 43-
62 (1998) (offering another recent statement suggesting that the absence of an ade-
quately determined sense of political morality militates against deeper political integra-
tion, at least in the sense of putative European statehood).
57. For the classic statement of this historical tension, see JACQUES DERRIDA, THE
OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON TODAY'S EUROPE (1992).
58. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROS-
PERITY (1995).
59. Aside from allusive treatment in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 1, par-
ticularly at pages 428-46, for Habermas's more immediate application of his thesis to
contemporary Europe, see Jfirgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Re-
flections on the Future of Europe, 12 PRAXIS Irr'L 1, 1-19 (1992) [hereinafter Habermas,
Citizenship and National Identity]; Jfirgen Habermas, The European Nation-State. Its Achieve-
ments and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, 9 RATIO
JURiS 125, 125-37 (1996) [hereinafter Habermas, The European Nation-State].
60. See William Rehg, Introduction to HABERMAS, supra note 1, at xxxix (discussing
this aspect of Habermas' ideas).
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dissimilar from that found in the recent writings of market com-
munitarians such as Fukuyama and John Kenneth Galbraith,61
Habermas suggests that, while a regulated market can be the
guarantor of liberal democracy, an unrestrained market is its
greatest threat. Contemporary Europe graphically describes a
world of alienated, disorientated consumers devoid of any re-
membrance of community or social solidarity, distanced from
the possibilities of political participation, any democratic aspira-
tions deflected by a consciously nurtured ethic of self-interest.6 2
The critical debilitating flaw in the new European order is the
absence of democratic control of administrative and market gov-
ernance-an argument that enjoys a familar resonance with the
much-debated "democratic deficit" in the Union. The most "dis-
turbing" characteristic of contemporary Europe, Habermas con-
cludes, is the "lack of constitutional controls of administrative
activity. ,63
Bureaucracy, at a Community and Union level, has systemat-
ically replaced facilities for participation at national and sub-na-
tional levels, and the result, according to Habermas, is a destruc-
tive fragmentation into competitive national and ethnic group-
ings that will ultimately detonate the idea of a "community of
Europeans." In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Eu-
rope's "citizens" do not identify with the Community, or at least
not primarily. In order to address this related crisis of identity
and legitimacy, there will need to be a revised "shared political
culture," one ultimately facilitated by the institution of proper
mechanisms of democratic governance. There is much truth in
Habermas' analysis of the European demise and much value in
his suggested resolution. The new European may indeed wish to
be prosperous, but he or she does not wish only to be prosper-
ous.
6 4
61. See FUKUyAMA, supra note 58 (providing Fukuyama's most recent statement);
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY. THE HUMANE AGENDA (1996) (offering
a more polemical variant).
62. For a similar thesis, argued from a more empirical standpoint, see C.
Hadjimichalis & D. Sadler, Open Questions: Piecing Together the New European Mosaic, in
EUROPE AT THE MARGINS: NEW MOSAICS OF INEQUALITY 238 (C. Hadjimichalis & D. Sad-
ler eds., 1995) (emphasizing that no amount of legalistic integration can make up for
ever-increasing polarization of wealth and resultant economic fragmentation).
63. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 428-31.
64. Even Adam Smith recognized that human beings, defined by a shared "moral
sentiment," were never solely driven by arguments of self-interest-a critical concession
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The new European also wants to determine him or herself
in a multitude of other ways, politically, socially, culturally, and
so on. This understanding, that political identity is polyvalent,
should serve to distinguish all modern political orders, Europe
included. But the history of European political and legal inte-
gration suggests a resistance to this truth. While recognizing the
demise of liberal constitutionalism, a demise immediately conso-
nant with that of sovereign nation-states, Europe has consistently
failed to embrace alternative ideas of democratic participation.
Thus, as Habermas concludes, what Europe now needs is not a
free market, but relief for an "exhausted" and "disintegrating"
sense of social solidarity, and such relief will only come by means
of radical institutional and constitutional reform.6 5
As Habermas further notes, the critical challenge facing the
post-metaphysical world, Europe included, is to work out mecha-
nisms of affinity and "solidarity between strangers." This obser-
vation, once again, is certainly accurate. But, at the same time, it
is arguable whether the problem can be readily resolved merely
in terms of restructuring political institutions. There will, in
short, need to be something more than that which is offered by a
theory of revised institutional democracy. Nation-states can ade-
quately-some would say more efficiently-effect institutional
democracy.66 The need to address the problem of "solidarity be-
tween strangers" acknowledges something deeper-a fundamen-
tal sense of humanity-and it is here that the theses articulated
by Tes6n and particularly by Nussbaum can add a further dimen-
sion to the analysis. The community "consciousness" that
Habermas seeks will be so much stronger and more durable if
there is a genuine sense in Europe of both humanity and com-
munity. Moreover, for reasons that we have already explored in
the second part of this Essay, the appreciation of this belief is
what distinguishes an integral Kantian public philosophy.
that has consistently served to undermine various arguments for a systematic economic
analysis of legal orders. For a commentary, specifically invoking Smith's "theory of
moral sentiments" against Richard Posner's economic analysis, see Robin Paul Malloy,
Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner and the Philosophy of Law and
Economics, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 209 (1988).
65. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 445; Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity,
supra note 59, at 2, 8-9; Habermas, The European Nation-State, supra note 59, at 125-37.
66. For a discussion of the relative merits of the nation-state as the most appropri-
ate cite of democracy, see Alan Dashwood, States in the European Union, 23 EUR. L. REv.
201-16 (1998).
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The new Europe, of course, has long identified with the
rhetoric of community. The European Community, mutating
from its earlier form as a specifically Economic Community, has
evolved further and is now governed by a supervening Union of
member states and "peoples." But the "Community" remains the
legal and economic centrepiece. But what precisely is a Euro-
pean "community"? Before contemplating what it might be-
come, or what sort of public philosophy might enrich the con-
cept of a European community, it is instructive to consider what
the Community thinks that it is. There is, notoriously, plenty of
rhetoric, various expressions scattered around various Treaty ar-
ticles, and in a number of European Court judgments: refer-
ences to rights to this and that, statements about the importance
of democracy, freedom, even equality. None are, of course, de-
fined. This absence of a precise definition is not itself unusual.
Constitutions frequently make reference to certain constitu-
tional aspirations, but rarely flesh them out. Moreover, as Ron-
ald Dworkin has suggested, this absence is a good thing, for con-
stitutional documents are not the place in which to establish
firm rules for the immediate resolution of real political or ethi-
cal issues. Instead, the inquiring citizen must look to the polit-
ical morality within which the various constitutional statements
are made. This inquiry, after all, is what real judges in real
courts do.6 7
It is for this reason, of course, that we need to be able to
detect a European public philosophy. Otherwise, there will be
no way of ascertaining precisely what the rhetoric means in real
political situations. The particular rhetoric of a European public
philosophy can be detected in various Treaty articles, of which
two might repay special attention. Article 2 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") suggests that
the Community should seek to promote a "solidarity among
member states,"68 while Article 6 of the Consolidated Treaty on
67. For Dworkin's most substantive treatment of the jurisprudence of constitu-
tional morality, see RONALD DWORKIN, Lnw's EMPIRE (1986); for a more recent applica-
tion of the thesis to the actual practice of judicial interpretation and adjudication, see
RONALD DWORKN, FREEDOM'S LAw (1997).
68. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 2, OJ. 224/1,
at 8 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 588 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes
made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
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European Union ("Consolidated TEU"), as introduced by the
Treaty of Amsterdam, in turn, suggests that the "Union is
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. ''6 9
These are principles that are, apparently, "common to the Mem-
ber States." Taken together, therefore, how does this rhetoric
play out within the political morality of Europe?
First, it can be reasonably concluded that there is no tradi-
tion, historical or ethical, that assumes fundamental human
rights. Examples of human rights compromised in order to fa-
cilitate certain principles of market action are legion. Even in
cases that are supposed to define the Community's commitment
to human rights, such as Wachauf, the Court of Justice still took
care to emphasize that such rights were never "absolute," but de-
pendent upon the wider interests of the Community. Such a res-
olution, articulated also in cases such as Grogan, has attracted a
considerable critical literature, which has sought to question
whether the European Court "takes rights seriously."7 °  Of
course, such cases are, by definition, "hard cases," involving al-
ternative visions of fundamental humanity. What was so striking
about the resolution of cases like Grogan, however, is the fact
that the Court remains stoically impervious to the idea that the
question of humanity is necessarilly relevant to the politics of
operating a free market. The fiction of the rational economic
actor dispelled the essential humanity of the individual.71
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1
(1987), (1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
69. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 1 (8),
O.J. C 340/1, at 8 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (replac-
ing Article F(1) of TEU); Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art.
6, O.J. C 340/2, at 153 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67, 69 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consoli-
dated TEU] (ex Article F(1)), incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the TEU will be renumbered in the
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra,
art. 12, OJ. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
70. Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt ffir Ernhhrung und Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88
[1989] E.C.R. 2609, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 328; Society for the Protection of Unborn Chil-
dren Ireland Ltd. v. Stephen Grogan and Others, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4685,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849.
71. For a discussion of morality of the Grogan case, see Diarmuid Rossa Phelan,
Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court ofJustice and
the Normative Shaping of the European Union, 55 Moo. L. REv. 670-89 (1992). For a chal-
lenging critique of the European Court's approach to human rights, see Jason Coppel
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Moreover, the extent to which the Union discriminates be-
tween those rights enjoyed by European citizens and those en-
joyed by others further militates against any principled under-
standing of rights. Once again, the extent to which the
Schengen arrangements breach the rights recognized in the Ge-
neva and European Conventions is well documented.72 And
there is a particular irony here, for Article 6.2, suggestively, af-
firms a "respect" for those rights guaranteed by the European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.73
Yet it only vests legal authority insofar as these rights chime with
"general principles of Community law."74 Here, of course, the
argument completes a circle: human rights are derived from
general legal principles, which are themselves derived from a re-
spect for human rights. The idea and the concept are entirely
confused. It can only be concuded that so-called "human" rights
in the European Union are exclusively derivative, for there is no
understanding that they are definitive of humanity understood
in terms of autonomous moral selves.
In the absence of human rights derived from an apprecia-
tion of humanity, there can only be free-standing civil rights,
founded on nothing more than political chance-rights that
may be constructively rational, but only insofar as that rationality
is procedural, rather than principled. Yet, even here, the Com-
munity seems unable, or unwilling, to grasp the basic founda-
tions for a public philosophy: civil rights protected by the rule of
law. The rule of European law is severely restricted to the gov-
ernment of the common market, together with a series of collat-
eral areas of social policy. Similarly, as we have noted, the "rule
of law" is one of the "principles" common to the Member States.
But there is little point in having a European "rule of law" if all
the civil rights of the citizen remain derived from those Member
& Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 12 LEGAL STUD.
227-45 (1992). For a recent review of the critique, see J.H.H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S.
Lockhart, "Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously: The European Court and Its Fundamental
Rights Jurisprudence, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 51-94, 579-627 (1995).
72. The potential breaches were outlined in the Meijers Commission. For a gen-
eral overview of these procedures and the extent to which European law consistently
deprives thousands of his "residents" of their human rights, see M. SPENCER, STATES OF
INJUSTICE (1995). -
73. TEU, supra note 68, art. F(2), OJ. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728.
74. Id.
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States. Union citizenship remains contingent upon prior citizen-
ship of a Member State. Much commentary prior to the Amster-
dam Treaty75 suggested the need to address this particular
anomaly. Nothing was done. 6
Accordingly, Union citizenship vests no civil rights that are
effective under the jurisdiction of Community institutions, most
obviously the European Court. If the citizens of Europe are sub-
ject to a rule of law, in the jurisdictional sense, then it is a rule
determined at a national level. Article 177, dedicated to main-
taining the national authority of national courts, is eloqent testi-
mony to this legal fiction.7 7 Moreover, Community civil rights,
such as they are, remain derived from nation-states. The rheto-
ric of solidarity remains couched in terms of solidarity "between"
nation-states, and not between people. All in all, the "rule of
law" in the Community sense is restricted to a limited area of
law, and a limited number of citizens as determined by the na-
tion-states-an absurdly vacuous conception entirely detached
from ethical or political principle.
From a rather different perspective, if the rhetorical notions
of "solidarity" or the "rule of law" are defined in the Kantian
sense, of fundamental equality, an approach adopted by such as
Nussbaum or Rawls, then there is a further failing. There is little
evidence of a genuine sense of social or legal equality in the Eu-
ropean Union. Taking one obvious example, much is made of
gender equality in European law. Yet, the evidence of European
law, of the concept as opposed to the principle of equality, sug-
gests that substantial inequalities remain. While the various di-
rectives that seek to establish gender equality in the workplace
aspire to "equal treatment" or "equal pay for equal work," their
legal and political interpretation falls a long way short of genu-
ine equality.
Only if law, and the idea of the "rule of law," is understood
in its most rigorously positivistic sense, can simple formal equal-
ity suffice to satisfy even the most basic ideas of fundamental
equality. In substantive terms, women in the European work-
75. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 69.
76. For a recent overview of the inadequacies of the Union conception of citizen-
ship, seeJ. Shaw, The Interpretation of Euraopean Union Citizenship, 61 MoD. L. REv. 293-317
(1998).
77. EC Treaty, supra note 68, art. 177, O.J. C 224/1, at 63 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 689.
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place, or indeed in the European family, do not enjoy equality;
and by definition, given that the equality is supposed to be se-
cured by law, such inequalities are constructively perpetuated by
European jurisprudence. Following the Kantian analysis, the dif-
ference between formal equality and substantive inequality is
once again derived from a fundamental dissonance between the
idea of equality and its proper translation into a legal and polit-
ical concept.78 Equality is derived from a sense of humanity. It
is a human right. In Europe, it is a purely civil right, of applica-
tion in certain restricted circumstances, and always subject to a
political morality that triumphs alternative market values.
So much for principle. As a matter of politics, it cannot be
denied that the Union is still governed by its nation-states.79 The
principle of subsidiarity, as worked out following the Maastricht
Treaty80 and now entrenched in the Amsterdam Treaty,81 pro-
vides further evidence that the nation-states retain their ultimate
political authority. 82 It is a sense enhanced too by the inclusion
at Amsterdam of the much vaunted principle of "flexibility," a
concept that has been rightly dismissed as "plastic"-an impover-
ished and even more ill-defined variant of the already confused
notion of subsidiarity.83 In this sense, therefore, the idea of a
European political community remains essentially aspirational.
At the same time, the necessary conditions for the formation of a
narrative sense of community remain largely absent, and so long
as the weight of governmental and cultural authority remains lo-
cated in the nation-states, then it will continue to be absent.
Yet, perhaps the most critical absence, in the sense of forg-
ing some sort of community identity, is the lack of a "common
good." Communities need a common good, which is more than
a simple common purpose. Europe seems to have a common
78. For a compelling analysis of the distinction between ideas of formal and sub-
stantive equality, see Helen Fenwick & Tamara K. Hervey, Sex Equality in the Single Mar-
ket: New Directions for the European Court of Justice, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 443-70
(1995).
79. See Dashwood, supra note 66, at 201-16.
80. TEU, supra note 68.
81. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 69.
82. For a discussion emphasizing the extent to which subsidiarity should be seen as
a mechanism for enhancing the concentration of power at the nation-state level, see A.
Teasdale, Subsidiarity in Post-Maastricht Europe, 64 POL. Q. 187-97 (1993).
83. SeeJ. Shaw, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy, 4 EUR.
L.J. 63-86 (1998) (perceptively aligning the ill-determination of flexibility with pervasive
and unresolved problems of political and constitutional legitimacy).
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purpose, the making of money. But this purpose is, to return to
Kantian parlance, a means. It is not an end. Not only is there
no substantive sense of either human or civil rights, founded on
an appreciation of essential humanity, but also there is no sense
of virtue. What makes a good European citizen, even for those
who are fortunate enough to be granted that status? Presuma-
bly, it is the capacity to make a profit, to fulfill the fantasies of
the rational economic actor. It cannot be to create solidarity
amongst the citizenry because the solidarity to which Europe as-
pires is one between Member States.
Of course, the residual authority of nation-states may be a
good thing. In the absence of a common good, or an apprecia-
tion of a proper sense of humanity, or even a recognition of the
need for proper democratic institutions, it may be that authority
should remain vested in nation-states.84 As we have already
noted, the inadequacies of representative democracy in the new
Europe are well documented. Moreover, as with all the other
gaping constitutional and institutional inadequacies that have
been identified over the past decades, the "democratic deficit"
remains as great in the wake of Amsterdam as it did after Maas-
trictht8 5 Indeed, it can be suggested that the experience of Eu-
rope identifies the essential fictions of modernist ideas of repre-
sentative democracy. The periodic voting for pre-selected candi-
dates is not what democracy is about.
Democracy must come to mean more. This argument, as
we have seen, is at the heart of both Nussbaum's and Habermas'
critiques. Democracy means the ability to participate in the deci-
sions that shape the communities within which moral selves live.
It is a matter of self-definition that, as Kant noted, is a human
right-a right derived from an appreciation of fundamental hu-
manity. Accordingly, within the particular context of the Euro-
pean Union, the market must be democratized, and the same
could apply to the workplace, and indeed all areas of social and
84. This is certainly Dashwood's argument. See Dashwood, supra note 66, at 213,
216.
85. For a discussion of the continuing inadequacies, see Amaryllis Verhoeven, How
Democratic Need European Members Be? Some Thoughts After Amsterdam, 23 EUR. L. REv. 217-
34 (1998). For a post-Maastricht analysis, see Philip Raworth, A Timid Step Forwards:
Maastricht and the Democratisation of the European Community, 19 EUR. L. REv. 16-33
(1994).
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industrial policy.86 Yet, once again, the possibility of enjoying
such an empowering sense of democracy in Europe is entirely
absent-an absence that only serves to compound the impover-
ished and inadequate forms of representative democracy pres-
ently employed.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It can only be concluded that the stated principles of Article
2 of the EC Treaty and Article 6 of the TEU remain wholly rhe-
torical. There is no constitutional morality that can be used in
order to furnish either meaning or legitimacy. There is no foun-
dational or narrative sense of fundamental rights, of freedom, of
democracy, of the rule of law, or of solidarity. In turn, it must be
recognized that the related crises of governance, of legitimacy
and identity, will remain unresolved until this absence is re-
dressed. The ultimate purpose of this Essay is to suggest that a
coherent and mature public philosophy for any modern political
community requires treatment of principles described in each of
the three theses reviewed: those articulated by Tes6n, Nuss-
baum, and Habermas. The three, as has been consistently
noted, constitute parts of a whole-variants of a Kantian descrip-
tion of humanity and its situation in modern political society.
Certainly, as Tes6n suggests, the emergence of new world
orders, and an international law that attempts to define and to
regularize such orders, must be founded upon a fundamental
recognition of the sanctity of the moral self-a sanctity that finds
its conceptual expression in the idea of fundamental human
rights. At the same time, however, there must be an equal ac-
knowledgment that moral selves operate, and exercise their
political judgment and make their political decisions, within the
historical and narrative framework described by the communi-
ties that they in turn describe. This acknowledgment is the criti-
cal edge of Nussbaum's thesis. Individuals identify with commu-
nities, and politics has no meaning outside such communities. It
was a thesis repeatedly confirmed in Kant's later political writ-
ings. It was also confirmed time and again by Hannah Arendt,
who also noted with perception that individuals only identify
86. For a recent discussion of the possibilities within these particular areas, see L.
Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social Policy, 23 EUR.
L. REv. 20-36 (1998).
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fully, and constructively, with communities within which they
feel the continuing capacity to participate.87 It is this insight that
is reinforced by Habermas. If the ethical legitimacy of a political
community is founded on a respect for the fundamental integ-
rity of the moral self, then the political legitimacy is dependent
upon facilitating the expression and empowerment of the practi-
cal reason that defines those selves.
If we accept the Kantian foundation for a public philosophy
in the new Europe, then there are three concomitant solutions,
suggested in turn by the three theses discussed in the first part of
this article. First, an acknowledgment of the fundamental dig-
nity of the moral self demands a proper appreciation of the cen-
trality of human rights in any just society. A political community
can, and indeed must, respect and secure human rights. But
such rights are not derived from the community. Civil rights are
derived from the political community, and their legitimacy is en-
tirely dependent upon their proper foundation upon an appre-
ciation of essential humanity. In short, it does not matter
whether that human is a European citizen or a citizen of a con-
stituent nation-state. It is enough that he or she is human.
Second, an acknowledgment that moral selves are dedicated
to the pursuit of common goods, a dedication itself defined by
the Kantian idea of constructive practical reason, requires that
the so-called European "community" strive to be precisely what it
claims to be: a community. The rhetoric of Article 2 of the EC
Treaty must come to mean something. Solidarity between mem-
ber states must be transformed into solidarity between the "peo-
ples of Europe." This aspiration cannot, of course, be readily
distinguished from the need to entrench certain fundamental
human rights properly. In traditional jurisprudential parlance,
such rights must be translated into effective civil rights, and
within the particular jurisprudence of European law, such a
translation requires a more thorough investment of social rights.
The pertinent example here, once again, is the right of gender
equality. Such rights, while expressed as civil or social rights,
must be understood as being grounded in fundamental human
rights of freedom and equality. Such is the insight of a discrete
Kantian theory of rights.
Citizenship, the proud constitutional boast of the Maas-
87. See ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION, supra note 24.
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tricht Treaty, must also come to mean something. Civil rights
must be understood in terms of citizenship, and in the Aristote-
lian tradition this means that such rights carry consonant re-
sponsibilities to an identifiable common good. Thus, to con-
tinue the particular example of rights of gender equality, the
rights that attach to women in the workplace-such as rights to
equal pay for equal work-must be understood as being derived
not from government but from the fundamental humanity of
each and every citizen within the community. A Kantian under-
standing of the idea of virtue requires each citizen to recognize
the fundamental equality of other citizens within the commu-
nity. Such rights, in short, may be expressed in civil constitu-
tions, but they are founded on a public philosophy that appreci-
ates the fundamental humanity of its constituent citizenry.
Third, following Habermas' analysis of the demise of liberal
legalism and the need to reinvest democratic institutions, it is
incumbent upon future European intergovernmental confer-
ences and Treaty reformers to address the continuing, and gap-
ing, failures of democracy, accountability, and transparency.
Again, tracing the genesis of Habermas' critique back to its Kant-
ian roots, it can be appreciated that democracy is not the partic-
ular reserve of certain civil constitutions, but an immediate ex-
pression of, and facility for, human rights. Citizens, in a political
community founded on principles of practical reason, have a
political right to participate in government. As Kant affirmed,
the ability to self-govern is the determining characteristic of the
rational moral self, and thus, political institutions must accord-
ingly be dedicated to facilitating the actual expression of this
ability.
Ultimately, each of the three critiques express various and
related attempts to redress a pervasive problem-that of legiti-
macy. Legitimacy, as we noted before, is intimately related to
the equally pervasive problem of identity. It is only when a polity
can evidence its legitimacy that it can then hope to secure the
degree of affinity that it needs to flourish. A citizenry needs that
common good, even if it is, in the final analysis, a product of the
political or narrative imagination. Legitimacy depends upon the
determination of a common good within a political commu-
nity-one that complements and promotes, rather than chal-
lenges, the fundamental rights of the moral selves that constitute
that community. Democratic reform of institutions is a neces-
960 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
sary procedural mechanism, a first step towards acknowledging
the veracity of this analysis. But, as we have already noted,
though necessary, it is not itself enough. Legitimacy aspires to a
deeper sense of affinity-an affinity that can only be secured by
a proper enactment of civil rights founded on an appreciation of
fundamental humanity.
